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Abstract 
The relationship of equity ownership mix and firm performance of a firm is an important area of study in the 
broader field of corporate finance which has received considerable attention in finance literature in the recent 
past. The objective of this study was to find out whether ownership identity has any influence in corporate 
performance of public companies listed in Nairobi Securities Exchange. The study was based on the Agency, 
Stewardship and Stakeholder theories which explained the interactions of different interested parties in the firm, 
conflicts that results and how they affect the performance of a firm. The target population of the study was 
public companies listed in Nairobi Securities Exchange and stratified random sampling design was used to 
identify and categories the firms, and then simple random sampling was used to identify the actual sample 
elements. A descriptive survey research design was primarily preferred as it was able to ensure proper 
construction of questions for soliciting required information, identification of individuals to be surveyed, means 
by which survey was conduted and summarizing of the data in a way that provided descriptive information. Data 
collection instrument used for the study include questionnaires with a guide, interviews and document analysis 
for secondary data derived from published company financial statement and Capital Market Authority periodic 
reports. For this study data collected was first be edited and then coded and categorized into different themes 
according to research variables. Qualitative data collected using the questionnaire was analyzed using descriptive 
statistics and represented in terms of tables, graphs and pie charts. Secondary data collected using content 
analysis was analyzed using inferential statistics in terms of correlation analysis application of Microsoft Excel 
analysis. 
Keywords: Equity ownership Culture, Firm Performance, Publicly Listed Companies in Kenya. 1.0 Background 
of the Study 
 
1.0 Background of the Study 
Firm ownership structure, one of mechanism in corporate governance to facilitate increased efficiency, has been 
understood to affect firm performance for many years. A number of agency problems resulting from the 
separation of ownership from control still prevail in firms globally (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Joint-stock 
companies are less efficient than private copartner companies because the directors would not watch over ‘other 
people’s money’ with ‘the same anxious vigilance’ as their own. The relationship between ownership structure 
and corporate performance are assumed to exist because ownership concentration and owner identity influence 
the incentives of each party within the firm, and thus influence the firm’s ability to solve agency problems. 
However, the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance remains blurred in previous 
studies.  The effective corporate governance structures help to prevent creation conflict of interests between the 
directors and shareholders by making information conformity and balance. In other words, these structures 
motivate the management to take the necessary measures for increasing the validity of the firm. Therefore, the 
more yield of the firm requires the improvement of corporate governance mechanisms, since it may cause to 
decrease agency costs, higher evaluation of shares, therefore the better performance in long run. (Brown and 
Caylor, 2004) postulates that reasonable investors will ask, if good corporate governance leads to improve the 
performance of capital markets in terms of creation of balance between rights and responsibilities of effective 
actors of corporate and management. A variable of corporate governance is ownership structure. The relation 
between the ownership structure and the performance of the firm is an important and continued subject in the 
field of financial management of the companies and the texts of financial management (Ezazi et al, 2011). In 
evaluating this relationship, different aspects of ownership structure are considered, for example being 
managerial or non-managerial shareholders, shareholder concentration or dispersion, being whole or retail, being 
internal shareholders, internal (domestic) or being foreign shareholders, being institutional or individual 
shareholders.  
1.1 Ownership Structure 
Company’s ownership structure can classically be examined along concentration and identity dimensions. Both 
of these have important implications for corporate governance. The identity of shareholders has important 
implications for corporate governance as shareholders differ with regards to their objectives, the manner in 
which they exercise their power and this is reflected in company strategy with regard to profit goals, dividends, 
capital structure and growth rates (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2007) pointed 
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out that “ownership structure matters to investors and creditors”. Primarily the driving factor is that some 
ownership types advocate for strong corporate governance that is seen to decrease financial risk. This is because 
putting perceived good governance mechanisms in place can boost a company’s capacity to attract capital. 
1.2 Kenya Perspective 
Ownership structure to a great extent determines corporate governance mechanisms to be adopted by a firm.  
Kenya has witnessed spectacular business failures such as the brokerage houses, routine suspension listed 
companies from trading at NSE, compromised financial results released by firms in Kenya. As a result, this 
driving the demand for changes in governance mechanisms especially in Kenya capital markets as it directly 
impact of firm’s performance. Such high profile scandals, financial crises and institutional failures have brought 
corporate governance issues to the fore in Kenya and investors and general public are making in-depth scrutiny 
of equity shareholders behind every firm. 
1.3 Statement of the Problem 
Firms listed in NSE not withstanding similar business environment and comparable sectoral background 
manifest different corporate performance. Kenya being an emerging market economy, widely dispersed 
corporate ownership is not the rule but the exception. What is prevalent are many firms with concentrated 
ownership. In such scenario the dominant shareholders have the capacity to directly control management (La 
Porta 1998). Hence dominant owner-managers to control corporate assets considerably greater, even, than their 
direct stock ownership rights would justify. As a result potential conflict of therefore tends to arise, not only 
between managers and shareholders but also between controlling shareholders on one hand and minority 
shareholders on the other.  It is postulated that the relationship between controlling shareholder and firm 
performance depends on who the controlling shareholder is. This study therefore, sought to establish the 
influence of various forms of firm ownership structures through controlling shareholders on its performance. 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure has a direct bearing on the risk-taking orientation of the firm. Agency problems arise 
whenever investment ideas and preferences of principals (owners) are at variance with those of their agents 
(Leech, 1991). (Xu and Wang, 1999) explored the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. In their study it showed that mix and concentration of stock ownership is significant in explaining 
the performance of the firm. Their results highlighted the importance of large institutional shareholding, 
potential problems in an overly dispersed ownership structure and the inefficiency of state ownership. However, 
(Minguez and Martin 2007) in their study about degree of control and firms value found that; the degree of 
control has a positive effect on firm value. In an endogenous way, ownership by major shareholders revealed   
impact on firm value; however the opposite relationship did not show any significance.  
2.2 Owner Identity and Firm Performance 
The existence of an owner identity effect is based on the argument that different owners may have different 
strategic goals and the controlling owner’s goal preference would influence the operation and performance of the 
firm. The most frequently defined identities are state, institution, foreign and dispersed ownership. 
2.3 State Holding and Firm’s Performance 
The government is a major shareholder in a number of Kenya companies that serve the public interest. Besides 
legislation, the government can use shareholdings to influence enterprises and in the public interest. The 
government holds shares in the companies such as monopolies, for example in the field of infrastructure, where 
investment costs are so high that there are unlikely to be competitors, institutions that provide services for the 
state or organizations associated with the state as such holdings reduce the government’s costs. (Dewenter, 2001) 
pointed out that apart from government ownership, controlling stake also refers to the government’s ability to 
appoint board members, senior management and make major decisions such as contract awards, strategy, 
restructuring and financing, acquisitions and divestments. Market economists have argued that firms in the hands 
of the government are inferior in performance to firms in private hands. According to (Shleifer, 1998) this 
argument arises due to their institutional relationship with the government, the market structure in which they 
operate, or the management systems applied within them. They have also been criticized for being too risk-
averse and lacking sufficient entrepreneurial drive. There have also been charges that certain government linked 
investments have been politically rather than commercially motivated. Thus it will result to the inefficient of 
financial system and give bad interpretation to the shareholders leading to poor financial performance. 
(Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1997) argue that state-owned firms are less efficient because they are immune 
from capital market scrutiny. As a result, managerial performance is inadequately monitored. The public trading 
of shares establishes the possibility of takeover by outsiders, introduces the discipline of the managerial labor 
market, and provides the ability to link compensation to performance. As a result, when shares trade in the public 
equity markets, owners have enhanced capacity to spur greater managerial effort and accountability. 
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2.4 Institutional holdings and Firms Performance 
Institutional ownership is the fraction of a firm’s shares that are held by institutional investors such as banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds and other corporate investors. A distinguishing characteristic of institutional 
holdings with respect to certain other owner categories is that they act as intermediate owners for the final agents. 
Institutional investors’ gravitation toward stocks of companies that have better governance structure is likely to 
be stronger than that of individual investors as they have strong fiduciary responsibilities and therefore prefer 
prudent investments (Del Guercio, 1996). (Cornett et al 2007) in a research titled "the impact of institutional 
ownership on corporate operating performance" analyzed the relationship between institutional shareholders as 
one of the mechanisms of corporate governance and operational yield of large companies. They found a 
significant and positive relationship between the ratio of operating cash flow to sales as a measure of 
performance and the number and percentage of institutional shareholders as corporate governance mechanism. 
(Cornett et al 2007). 
2.5 Foreign ownership and firm performance 
Foreign holdings constitute an important block of ownership among many firms in countries around the world. 
There are important governance implications for firms with and without foreign holdings which ultimately have 
a bearing on the performance of firms. These performance differences arise from the possession of certain firm 
specific advantages that accrue to the firm with foreign ownership. These firm specific advantages stem from 
advanced technological know-how, marketing and managing skills, export contacts, coordinated relationships 
with suppliers and customers and reputation (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Empirical studies have found evidence 
supporting such a conjecture. For instance, using a sample of Canadian firms, (Boardman et al., 1997), find 
significant performance differences among multinational enterprises or their subsidiaries and domestic firms. 
Among Thai firms, (Wiwattanakantang, 2001) finds that foreign controlled firms exhibit superior performance. 
Apart from foreign direct investments (FDI), the other major source of foreign capital is foreign portfolio or 
institutional investment (FPI/FII). The level of ownership of the foreign owners in their subsidiaries constitutes 
also a decisive determinant of the degree and type of influence they impose on the firm performance and 
profitability. Majority ownership with more than 51 percent enables foreign firms to better implement decisions 
without being obliged to recourse the votes of the rest of the shareholders. Furthermore, a foreign company 
holding the majority ownership stakes in own subsidiary could better convey tangible and intangible structures 
of corporate structure and corporate governance. Economies of scale could arise considering the information 
utilization. Not least, having the majority ownership simplifies control and monitoring and therefore the agency 
costs are lowered (Boardman et al., 1997).  (Douma et al., 2006) analyzed the effect of foreign ownership on the 
financial performance of Indian corporations with a distinction between foreign institutional and foreign 
corporate shareholders. This study found that foreign firms perform better than domestic ones in terms of Return 
On Assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q.  The same study concludes that ownership by foreign corporations has a 
positive and significant impact on both performance measures. When the results for foreign institutional 
investors were analyzed, no significant relationship was observed in terms of ROA. However, these investors 
have a positive and significant impact on Tobin’s Q and this impact is larger than that of foreign corporate 
shareholders. Thus, the researchers conclude that foreign institutional investors may be investing in firms that are 
already better in terms of market returns (Douma et al., 2006). As regards the effects of foreign investment on 
firm performance, it is argued that the observed higher productivity of foreign-owned firm because they are 
disproportionately concentrated in high productive sectors (Griffith (1999), by active monitoring, 
complementing the inadequate or inefficient monitoring of domestic institutions Choi and Yoo (2005), source of 
not only financing but also scarce monitoring skills and control-enabling property rights in emerging markets 
(Khanna and Palepu (1999), foreign shareholders outperform firm in which foreign shareholders exercise 
effective control (Chhibber and Majumdar (1999). 
2.6 Diverse Shareholding and Firm’s Performance 
Firms with dispersed ownership are the firms that have low ownership concentration. When there is not a single 
large shareholder or a group of shareholders that can control the firm, the managers, under the assumption of 
information asymmetry and opportunity behavior, is believed to take control over the firm.  (Wiwattanakantang, 
(2001) evaluates the impact of controlling shareholders on the financial performance of firms in Thailand. As a 
result of the analysis, he concludes that firms with controlling shareholders are better performers in terms of 
accounting-based measures, namely ROA and sales-assets ratio. However, no significant difference in 
performance is observed in terms of Tobin’s Q. (Thomsen and Pederson, 2000)  concluded that when there is 
distributed ownership, the other shareholders cannot participate in the corporate policy, and this weakness is 
related to corporate governance mechanism can lead to reduction of optimal performance. 
From various studies it is perceived that due to agency problems, diverse ownership structure will not give 
adequate control to the shareholders due to lack of capacity and motivation to monitor management decisions 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In dispersed ownership situations agency problem may arise in firms since 
shareholders' incentives and abilities to monitor management may be weakened. The fact that shareholders own 
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the firm, they do not feel any sense of control over it since their holding is not significant. In addition, 
shareholders usually invest in many firms in order to spread risk. Hence the motivation may not necessary be in 
the future of the firm but with short term capital gains and future dividend stream expectations. Moreover, 
dispersed shareholders may not have sufficient knowledge and information to make important decisions that will 
impact the future of the firm (lee, 2008). 
2.7 Measure of Firm Performance 
Three main approaches to firm level performance are found in social science research: research based on market 
prices, accounting ratios and total factor profitability (Fama, 1998). Behavioral finance challenge market based 
evaluation on grounds that for long periods firms can trade on financial markets at prices that do not reflect their 
fundamental value. Moreover, is it clear that not all markets are efficient, particularly in developing and 
emerging countries with nascent stock markets that are known to be illiquid and lacking in breadth and depth. 
According to (Verweire & Berghe, 2005), Return on Equity (ROE) and Return On Asset (ROA) are two widely 
used profitability parameters’ to measure companies performance.  With similar prominence is earning per share 
(EPS) and dividend per share (DPS).  In this study Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Price-
Earnings Ratio (PE) parameters were used. ROA is the net profit as a percentage of the total assets and measures 
how much profits a firm can achieve using one unit of assets. It helps to evaluate the result of managerial 
decisions on the use of assets which have been entrusted to them. ROE is the net profit as a percentage of equity 
value measures the earnings generated by shareholders’ equity of a period of time, usually one year. It 
encompasses three main levers which management can utilize to ensure health of the firm: profitability; asset 
management; and financial leverage. Price–Earnings ratio is the ratio of market share price to earnings per share 
(Fama, 1998). 
2.8 Summary of literature reviewed 
Literature reviewed gave mixed result with no clear cut line whether equity ownership structure influences 
financial performance of public companies. Some studies indicated that ownership structure only affect certain 
aspects of accounting performance but not value of the firm in the stock market. In other reviewed studies it was 
found that there was no systematic relationship between firms’ ownership structure and financial performance 
while (Miguez and Martin, 2007) had found that degree of ownership control had positive effects on the firm’s 
value. (Wiwattanakantang, 2001) compare the performance of the firms with an emphasis on different types of 
controlling shareholders. This comparison finds empirical evidence that family-owned companies, foreign-
controlled companies and firms with more than one controlling shareholder are better in terms of ROA than 
firms without controlling shareholders. (Wiwattanakantang, 2001). It’s on the background of these mixed 
findings that this study was carried out with intention of shedding light into corporate finance of the effects of 
ownership structure on the performance of public companies listed in NSE. 
2.9  Gaps filled by the study 
Performance measures used by previous researchers to measure financial performance of public companies with 
different ownership structures were mostly accounting based, such as return on sales, return on total assets, 
returns on equity, and operating efficiency measures and as such this study evaluated only return on equity and 
return on asset parameters. Beside the two, price-earning ratio market based performance measure was also used. 
In addition, though there has be an ongoing debate on corporate governance mechanisms stipulating various 
ownership and control structures, with reference to owner and manager relationships, little has been done to 
show how different ownership identities impacts firm performance. A good equity ownership structure should 
effectively monitor the board and the decision-making process. This should improve performance as the 
monitoring mechanisms ensure that shareholders' interests were being promoted. To meet the objectives of this 
study, this research, therefore sought to examine various types of ownership structures to find out what extent 
ownership structure influenced firm performance in an emerging market in the context of shareholder-manager 
and majority-minority shareholder relationships.  The literature on ownership and performance has been limited 
and no systematic patterns of relationship between ownership identity and company performance has been 
uncovered in the NSE. This could be due to fact that different ownership structures responds to different set of 
objective which may not be necessarily maximizing share holder wealth in the long term. However there has 
been increasing empirical evidence on the effects of ownership structure and firm performance in developed 
markets but little attention have been given in emerging markets such as Kenya to examine dynamics  of various 
ownership and their effects on company’s performance. This study bridged the above mentioned gaps. 
 
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Design  
The study adopted a descriptive survey research design. Orodho (2003) and Kothari (2004) describe a 
descriptive survey design as a design that seeks to describe accurately the characteristics of a particular 
individual, situation or a group.  
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3.2  Target Population and Accessible Population 
Population refers to the totality of items under investigation. According to (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003), the 
population should have some observable characteristics, to which the researcher intends to generalize the results 
of the study. In this study the target population consisted of all the companies listed in NSE. Data from NSE 
Listing manual year 2013 indicates that there are 61 listed companies which form the target population of this 
study (Appendix III).  For the purpose of this study an accessible population was screened from the target 
population. Firms that satisfied the following selection criteria were considered for composing the accessible 
population: Company had not been suspended for trading during the period under review for more than one year, 
Firm was listed before 2008, company had not merged or demerged from another listed company during the 
period under review and it was not a cross-list from the region. Only 44 out of 61 firms satisfied the above 
criteria and were considered for the study (Appendix IV).  Chief Financial Officers from each firm were the 
actual respondent. 
3.3 Sample and Sampling frame 
Sampling is the process of selecting a number of individual for a study in such a way that the individuals 
selected represent the large group from which they were selected. Sampling involves the researcher securing a 
representative group that will enable the researcher to gain information about the population (Mugenda and 
Mugenda, 2003).  A sample of 61% (sixty one percent) of the 44 firms will be extracted from the population for 
the purpose of the study. Thus, a sample of 27 companies was selected for the study due to time available for 
research and budgetary constraints. (Khan, 1993) warned that there is no fixed number of percentages of subjects 
that determine the size of an adequate sample. The ideal sample is large enough to serve as an adequate 
representation of the population about which the researcher wishes to generalize and small enough to be selected 
economically in terms of subject availability, expense in terms of time and money and complexity of data 
analysis. This study used both stratified sampling and simple random sampling. Stratified random sampling was 
used in each ownership identity structure to group respondents into four strata. These strata are state linked, 
Institution-linked, foreign linked and diverse linked ownership structures. Within each of the four strata, simple 
random sampling was carried out to identify firms to which respondents were sought and issued with 
questionnaires to respond to the research statements. Financial data on firms’ performance was the average of 
five years (2008-2012) while primary data on the ownership structure was gathered from publication 
publications from NSE and CMA. The controlling shareholders invested in the firm for more than 5 years were 
assumed to be strategic and long-term. 
TABLE I SAMPLING FRAME 
Item Target Population Sample (61% of the target Population) 
State linked 8 5 
Institution Linked 20 12 
Foreign Linked 13 8 
Diverse Linked 2 2 
Total 44 27 
Source: Primary Data 
3.4  Data collection Instruments  
The instrument used by the researcher in the study was document analysis, and questionnaires with guide, which 
is a list of questions to be answered by the respondents in order to get facts and information of interest to the 
researcher.  According to (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003), questionnaires are commonly used to obtain important 
information about a population under study. The questionnaires were administered during the period the month 
of July, 2013 and concluded in August 2013.  
3.5  Data Collection Procedures 
Document analysis was used to get secondary data from published annual financial reports of the sampled 
companies. Financial data on firms’ performance are the average of five years (2008-2012) while primary data 
on the ownership structure was from publication publications from NSE and CMA. The controlling shareholders 
of more than 3 years investors were assumed to be strategic and long-term. Primary data to back, verify and 
supplement secondary data were collected through the administration of questionnaires to the sampled 
respondents.  
3.6 Reliability 
According to (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003) reliability is a measure of the degree to which a research 
instrument yields consistent results or data after repeated trials. An instrument is reliable when it can measure a 
variable accurately and obtain same results under same conditions over a period of time. In this study, split half 
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method was used to test the instruments, before the actual data collection was do
inconsistencies in responses received, essential adjustments such as simplification of language, reframing of the 
questions and restructuring order of questionnaires was done to ensure that the final instruments would gathered 
the desired information.   
3.7 Validity 
Validity measure ensures that the research tool is measuring what researcher intends to measure or want to 
measure.  In this study, to validate the data collected, the researcher used other methods for instance comparing it 
with existing information in various publications. 
information gathered with various companies’ annual reports and also through observation to ensure desired 
consistency was achieved. The study also employed content validity method. The validity 
was tested through discussion with the three chief financial officers of three randomly selected firms, and their 
proposed changes to the instrument were incorporated to enhance its validity.
3.8 Data Processing and Analysis
Data collected was analyzed using SPSS version 19 to generate descriptive and inferential statistics. Microsft 
Excel was also used to generate graphs and charts. The responses on the likert scale questionnaire were coded 
and input in the SPSS software. A simple correlat
independent variable and the dependent variables. This helped to explain the magnitude and direction of 
relationship between the variables of the study through the use of correlation, coefficient o
the level of significance. The basis of the relationships advanced in the model established how ownership 
structure influenced the performance of the firm. 
3.9 Ethical Issues in Research  
The researcher endeavored to remain ethical in the 
every questionnaire. This served to explain the purpose of the study, seek for voluntary participation and assured 
the respondents of confidentiality. 
 
4.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Interpretation and discussion of results
The sample population of the research was 27, therefore 27 questionnaires were administered and 27 
questionnaires were analyzed because there was no non
follow up of the remaining questionnaires after the first collection.
Section B of the questionnaire requested the company ownership information from the respondents. Question B3 
required the respondents to indicate the company ownership of their respective companie
shows the final distribution of the findings.
FIGURE I: PERCENTAGE OF EACH O
Source: Primary Source 
In section C, the various variables that were used to measure the performance of these companies are: Return on 
Equity, Return on Asset and Price earning Ratio. The performance of the four categories of the companies is as 
below. 
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Table II : 5 Firms’ Years Percentage Return on Equity
Identity 2008 
State 0.12 
Institutions 0.19 
Diverse 0.15 
Foreign 0.23 
Market Average 0.17 
Source: Primary Data 
TABLE III: 5 FIRMS’ YEARS PERCENTAGE 
Identity 2008 
State 0.05 
Institutions 0.09 
Diverse 0.09 
Foreign 0.14 
Market Average 0.09 
Source: Primary Data 
TABLE IV: 5 FIRMS’ YEARS PRICE-
Price Earning Ratio 
Identity 2008
State 10.76
Institutions 19.76
Diverse 8.74
Foreign 24.29
Market Average 15.89
Source: Primary Data 
The analysis of the above tables is as below:
(a) RETURN ON EQUITY VARIABLES
(i) CORRELATION BETWEEN MARKET AVERAGE  AND STATE LINKED FIRMS
FIGURE III: ROE PERFORMANCE 
Source: Primary Data 
This output gives the correlation between the market average and the state linked 
Equity. They have a strong positive correlation with the coefficient correlation of (0.943), indicating that there is 
statistically significance (p<0.05) linear relationship between the variables. The state linked firms also pe
below the average of the Market Price.
(ii) CORRELATION BETWEEN THE MARKET AVERAGE AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONS 
LINKED FIRMS 
FIG IV: ROE Performance Correlations for Institution Linked Firms
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% Return on Equity 
2009 2010 2011 2012 
0.12 0.14 0.15 0.14 
0.23 0.18 0.18 0.18 
0.10 0.18 0.22 0.09 
0.28 0.27 0.30 0.40 
0.18 0.19 0.21 0.20 
RETURN ON ASSET 
% Return on Asset 
2009 2010 2011 2012 
0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 
0.10 0.08 0.07 0.08 
0.05 0.17 0.14 0.07 
0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21 
0.10 0.13 0.12 0.11 
EARNING RATIO 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 8.09 10.58 5.32 5.88 
 14.24 18.43 11.16 10.09 
 11.71 8.68 3.25 4.95 
 13.22 12.53 9.56 9.56 
 11.82 12.56 7.32 7.62 
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Source: Primary Data
The output is a correlation between the Market 
Equity. There is a strong Negative correlation with the coefficient on(
significance(p<0.05) linear relationship between the variables. The local linked
average Market price. 
(iii) CORRELATION BETWEEN THE MARKET AVERAGE AND FOREIGN LINKED
FIG V: ROE Performance Correlations for Foreign Linked Firms
Source: Primary Data 
The result reflects a correlation between the Market average
a strong positive correlations with the coefficient of (0.648), indicating there is a statistically significance 
(p<0.05) linear relationship between the variables. The foreign linked firms perform abov
performance. 
(iv) CORRELATION BETWEEN THE MARKET AVERAGE AND DIVERSE LINKED FIRMS
FIG VI: ROE Performance Correlations for Diverse Linked Firms
Source: Primary Data
This output gives a correlation between the Market average and the Divers
indicates a weak positive correlation between the Diverse Linked Firms and the Market averages with the 
coefficient correlation of (0.377), indicating that there is insignificance (p>0.05) linear relationship between the 
variables. The performance in the Diverse Linked Firms is slightly below the average market price. 
The figure below summarizes the performance of the companies according to ROE.
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Fig VII: Summary of All Firms Returns on Equity
Source: Primary Data
(b) RETURN ON ASSETS 
(i) CORRELATION BETWEEN STATE LINKED FIRMS AND MARKET AVERAGES
 
FIG VIII: ROA Performance Correlations for State Linked Firms
Source: Primary Data 
The result reflects a correlation between the Market average and the State linked firm’s performance. I
strong positive correlations with the coefficient of (0.687), indicating there is a statistically significance (p<0.05) 
linear relationship between the variables. The performance in the State Linked firms is much more below the 
Market average. 
(ii) CORRELATION BETWEEN THE MARKET AVERAGE AND THE INSTITUTION LINKED 
FIRMS 
 
FIG IX: ROA Performance Correlations for Institution Linked Firms
Source: Primary Data 
The output is a correlation between the Market average and the local institutions linked Firm
Assets. There is a strong Negative correlation with the coefficient on(
significance(p<0.05) linear relationship between the variables. The local linked institutions perform much below 
the average Market price. 
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(iii) CORRELATION BETWEEN THE MARKET AVERAGE AND THE  FOREIGN LINKED 
FIRMS 
                FIG X: ROA Performance Correlations for Foreign Linked Firms
Source: Primary Data 
This output gives a correlation between the Market average and the Forei
indicates a weak positive correlation between the Foreign Linked Firms and the Market averages with the 
coefficient correlation of (0.395), indicating that there is insignificance (p>0.05) linear relationship between the 
variables. The performance in the Foreign Linked Firms is above the average market price.
(iv) CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE MARKET AVERAGE  AND THE DIVERSE  BASED 
FIRMS 
FIG XI: ROA Performance Correlations for Diverse Linked Firms
Source: Primary Data 
This output gives the correlation between the market average and the Diverse linked firms based on the Return 
on Assets. They have a strong positive correlation with the coefficient correlation of (0.943), indicating that there 
is statistically significance (p<0.05) lin
slightly below the average of the Market Price.
The figure below shows a summary of the performance according to the Return on Asset.
Fig XII: Summary of All Firms Returns on Asset
Source: Primary Data 
(c) PRICE EARNINGS PER RATIO
(i) CORRELATIONS BETWEEN STATE LINKED FIRMS AND THE MARKET AVERAGE
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FIG XIII: PE Performance Correlations for State Linked Firms
Source: Primary Data 
The output is a correlation between the Market average and the St
Ratio. There is a weak Negative correlation with the coefficient on (
insignificance (p>0.05), linear relationship between the variables. The state linked firms perform
average Market price. 
(ii) CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INSTITUTION LINKED FIRMS AND MARKET AVERAGE
FIG XIV: PE Performance Correlations for Institution Linked Firms
Source: Primary Data 
The output is a correlation between the Market average and the Instit
per Ratio. There is a weak Negative correlation with the coefficient on (
insignificance (p>0.05),linear relationship between the variables. The state linked firms perfor
average Market price. 
 
(iii) CORRELATION BETWEEN FOREIGN LINKED FIRMS AND MARKET AVERAGE
FIG XV: PE Performance Correlations for Foreign Linked Firms
Source: Primary Data 
The output is a correlation between the Market average and the Foreign  link
per Ratio. There is a weak or neglible Negative correlation with the coefficient on (
statistically insignificance (p>0.05), linear relationship between the variables. The foreign linked firms 
slightly above the average Market price.
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(iv) CORRELATION BETWEEN DIVERSE LINKED FIRMS AND MARKET AVERAGE
FIG XVI: PE Performance Correlations for Diverse Linked Firms
Source: Primary Data 
The output is a correlation between the Market average and the
Assets. There is a strong Negative correlation with the coefficient on (
significance (p<0.05) linear relationship between the variables. The diverse linked instituti
below the average Market price. 
The figure below shows a summary of the performance according to the Price Earning Ratio.
Fig XVII: Summary of All Firms on Price Earning Ratio
Source: Primary Data 
5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMME
5.1 Summary 
From the analysis, it is clear that the shareholders’ structure and control of the companies listed in the Nairobi 
Stock Exchange has an impact on the performance of the company. The impact could either be positive or 
negative. The summary of the findings is as below.
5.2 State Linked Companies 
From the analysis, it is clear that on accounting performance indicators i.e. ROE and ROA, state linked firms on 
average at 13% and 6% respectively lagged behind firms in other categories. Market
while ROA was 11%. This can be attributed by government using its controlling shareholding position to 
influence enterprises in the public interest, hence sacrificing entrepreneurial drive to promote social good. This 
may change the focus from shareholder value mediation to balance interest of all stake holders, thereby causing 
low yields on return on equity. Political interference may also lead to hiring incompetent board members and 
management. This coupled with monopolistic natur
misuse of resources, hence poor return on assets as they may not be fully utilized.  In regard to PE, which is 
common parameter used by investors to determine if company's stock price is over or und
depicts come second last at 8% and below market average of 11%. This can be attributed to the fact that since 
state owned enterprise future outlook is not very promising in terms of growing the business, in the eyes of 
investors, they may not be able to pay for such firm expensively today hoping to have their value increase in 
future.   
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5.3 Institutional Linked Companies 
For all the parameters, this category shows mixture of performance. ROE was 19% second best performing 
category, though at same level with market average. This can be attributed to institutional investors’ gravitation 
towards stocks of companies that have better governance structure is likely to be stronger than that of individual 
investors as they have strong fiduciary responsibilities and therefore prefer prudent investments. Better still, they 
have capacity to demand specific performance level from management and may influence company’s investing 
strategy. In terms of ROA, this category was the second lowest performance at 8% compared market average of 
11% . Though this category of investors scrutinize management to ensure proper usage of firm resources as well 
as maintaining high efficiency levels, this poor performance can be attributed to the fact that some of these 
institutional shareholders have heavily invested in highly regulated firms like banks and insurance companies, 
which have their asset levels and utilization under strict requirement levels. This can hinder management of such 
firms to fully utilize their assets at their disposal. For instance, a bank cannot lend beyond certain limit stipulated 
by Central Bank of Kenya, even though it may have capacity do so. Institutional shareholders make investment 
in companies with enormous future growth potential. This can explain a high PE of 14% highest among the 
categories. Such companies in the eyes of investors have prospect of doing very well in future, hence they are 
willing to pay for them at a premium in lieu of wealth growth in future.  
5.4 Foreign Linked Companies 
In this category, both the ROE and ROA is the highest at 30% and 18% respectively, far above market average. 
Many factors can be attributed to this including specific advantages stemming from advanced technological 
know-how, marketing and managing skills, export contacts, coordinated relationships with suppliers and 
customers and reputation among others. These advantages were well reflected in the firm performance. However, 
these firms mainly consist of foreign shareholders who have made direct investment and have a long term 
commitment to the business. Foreign investors whose intention is just to hold portfolio of any company, are not 
concerned on long term prosperity of the firm but short term capital gains that can be realized through stock 
trading. The PE of this category is relatively moderate at 13.8% slightly above market average of 11%. This 
implies that in the eyes of the investors, the see long term potential hence paying more presently hoping to reap 
superior returns in future. 
5.5 Diverse Linked Companies 
Over the period under the study, this category’s ROE and ROA stood at 15% and 10% respectively. In both 
aspects, the performance was slightly below market average. This can be attributed to nonexistent of major 
controlling shareholders who can put management on its toes. When there is not a single large shareholder or a 
group of shareholders that can control the firm, the managers, under the assumption of information asymmetry 
and opportunity behavior, is believed to take control over the firm. This therefore can lead to management 
making decisions that may not best serve interest of the shareholders but satisfy their own ends. In terms of PE, 
the diverse ownership still lags behind other categories and below market average. This can be attributed to 
perception by investing public that these companies are of low value and as long as status quo is maintained, 
prospects of good performance in future is still uncertain, thereby unwilling to pay a premium on the shares 
above their current earning capability. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The research objectives were as below: 
I. To find out if state ownership has influence on firm performance. 
II. To ascertain whether ownership by institutions impacts firm performance. 
III. To investigate whether foreign ownership has effect on firm performance. 
IV. To find out if diverse ownership affects firm performance. 
From the findings, it is clear that: 
I. State ownership has a negative influence on a firms performance 
II. Ownership by institutions impacts both negatively and positively on a firm’s performance.  
III. Foreign ownership has positive effect on a firm’s performance  
IV. Diverse ownership affects a firm’s performance negatively.  
5.7 Recommendations 
Though state need to serve social good, it has attracted other investors some of it enterprises. Therefore it needs 
to balance social and commercial interest in those enterprises. This can be achieved by positively using its 
controlling influence to institute robust management systems that will promote efficiency, ensure good corporate 
governance systems and minimize political interference in running of the enterprises.  
Institutional ownership influences decision of managers. Hence tend to over scrutinize their action and freedom 
of making choices. This can tend to bring about complacency of the part of management and not utilities their 
expertise, creativity and wisdom to execute the corporate strategy. This in the end may lead firm’s inconsistent 
performance. Some institutional investors may not have long term commitment to the business but short term 
interest, this will bring conflicting position with those whose investment preferences is long term. Therefore, this 
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class of investors should not over domineer the management but always harmonize their expectation. In addition 
for them to meet their desired goals, they need to understand the preferences of other institutional shareholders in 
the same company. This will help them to align their goals with other shareholders. 
Firms owned by foreigner who have direct investment has far outperformed others regardless of the industry or 
sector the investment has been made. Domestic investors need to study model employed by foreign investors and 
apply the same in managing their firms. The country should also make investment environment conducive to 
attract more foreign investors. This will help to promote and transfer best business practices to other domestic 
firms. 
As opposed to developed markets where most of the firms have many shareholders with no controlling 
shareholder, the case is different in Kenya and in emerging markets as a whole. Block shareholding is a common 
place in countries such as USA, and UK. During this study, it was noted that number firms with diverse 
ownership is still very small. This may be due to founding owners still holding onto their position as well as 
underdeveloped capital markets in Kenya, where many potential individual has not been keen in investing in. 
Management of these companies has free hand to steer the company in direction they want, and at time may not 
to the best interest of all shareholders. Diverse ownership should be encouraged; investors should be educated on 
opportunities in capital markets, and comprehensive code of corporate governance implement and fully enforced 
to ensure that investors who invest in such firm are not exploited by management. 
Potential future study should delve into trickle down effects on the firms category that performs better to other 
listed companies and other business enterprises in Kenya. Also issue to do with protection of minority 
shareholders from their rights being overstepped by majority shareholders in making major decision, such as 
mergers and take-over should be considered.  
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